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DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGES
With the exception.of a few isolated instances, the Doctrine
of Continuous Voyages has been built up by England and the
United States. Each has extended it to meet the necessities of
the moment-England in the desire to retain the advantage given
by her large navy, and the United States in its attempt to make
tight its blockade of the ports of the Confederacy.
At the commencement of hostilities between nations, the com-
inrce of each becomes liable to capture and confiscation by the other.
In order that they might still continue it without such interruptions,
the belligerents turned their commerce over to neutrals, who claimed
exemption as such. England met this by holding that vessels so
engaged acquired the character of enemy shipping and so became
liable to capture and condemnation. To avoid this ruling, the
practice was begun of stopping at some neutral port. It was then
claimed by the neutral vessels that the ship was never proceeding
from one hostile port to another, but always 'between a hostile
and a neutral port. The English met this by holding that the
voyage was in effect continuous, notwithstanding such stop, and
was, therefore, unchanged as to its legal status, but remained a
voyage from one hostile port to another. Later the scheme was
adopted of unloading the cargo at the neutral port, paying duties,
and immediately reloading it into the same vessel. For some time
this was successful, but in the case of The William' in 1806, it
was held that as the goods were shipped from one hostile port
with the intent that they should reach another hostile port, the
unloading, payment of duties, and reloading, was mere ceremony
and without legal significance. The voyage was said to be con-
tinuous and the ship and cargo liable to capture and confiscation.
Matters stood thus for a period of almost fifty years, when
in 1855, during the Crimean War, the Hanoverian ship, Frau
Howina, bound for a neutral port with a cargo of saltpetre, was
captured by a French cruiser. Upon finding that the cargo was
ultimately intended for Russia, it was condemned by the French
prize court. This decision is important in that it is the first time
that the doctrine was extended to include contraband goods.
The next extension of the doctrine was made by the United
States during the War of the Rebellion. The North having
15 C. Robinson, 385.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
declared a blockade of the Southern ports, attempts were made to
ship cargoes intended for the Confederacy tp nearby neutral ports,
such as Nassau and Matamoros, where they would await the most
convenient opportunity for running the blockade. This was done
sometimes by transshipment to the fast blockade runners, some-
times by the same vessels that 'brought them. A number of these
vessels were captured before reaching the neutral port. The cases
of The Bermuda2 and The Peterhoff 3 and The Springbok 4 are
the most.widely known. In each case the ship was captured while
proceeding from one neutral port to another. On examination of
the cargos they were found to have an ultimate destination of
breaking the blockade and reaching Confederate hands. Parts of
the cargo were contraband, consisting of arms and munitions,
marked for the Confederacy. In the first case, both vessel and
cargo were condemned for attempt to break the blockade. In the
second case the cargo was seized as contraband and the vessel
for complicity, some papers having been destroyed at the moment
of capture. In the case of the Springbok, the cargo was condemned
for the same reason, but the ship was released, as the owners and
master were innocent as to the nature of the cargo. The law in
all three cases is the same, i. e., a cargo owned by a neutral and
shipped from one neutral port to another, where it appears that
it was ultimately intended for transshipment to the enemy, may be
condemned. Vessels carrying such goods were held subject to
capture that the goods might be brought in, and for any irregu-
larity of conduct were subject to the payment of costs as a condi-
tion of release, while upon evidence of any complicity in the
purpose of the owners of the cargo, they were stbject to con-
demnation.
While the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages was said by the
United States to apply in the case of transshipment of the cargo
at a neutral port, at the same time if the goods became absorbed
in the common stock of the country and later were bought and
shipped to an enemy port by others, the voyage was said to have
been broken and the doctrine did not apply. Hence it followed
that even though goods might eventually reach one of the bellig-
erents, or might release other goods for shipment to the enemy,
if their shipment to the neutral port was in good faith they could
23 Wall U. S. 514.
8 5 Wall U. S. 28.
45 Wall U. S. 1.
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not be condemned. To quote from the opinion of Chief Justice
Chase in the Bermuda case:
"Neutrals in their own country may sell to belligerents
whatever belligerents choose to buy * * * and so,
again, the neutrals may convey in neutral ships, from one
neutral port to another, any goods, whether contraband
of war or not, if intended for actual delivery at the port
of destination, and to become part of the common stock
of the country or of the port."
These rulings have been severely criticized by the European
jurists, some of whom went so far as to state that they were
without support outside of the United States, and would soon fall
into disrepute, even there. They were, however, ratified in sub-
stance by the ruling of the Italian prize court in the case of the
Dutch ship Doelwyk, captured by an Italian cruiser during the
war with Abysinnia in 1896,5 and again by the Seventeenth Article
of the Japanese Regulations.of March, 1904, as to maritime capture.
At the commencement of the present war, the English doctrine
as stated in the Declaration of London, was substantially the same,
but as time went on it became apparent that neutrals had found
an effective method of avoiding it. Goods were shipped to Sweden
and Denmark, where they became a part of the common stock of
the country. It soon became evident from the great increase in
imports, that most of these goods were being bought in the open
market by German agents, who then shipped them across the Baltic
into Germany. The fact that they became a part of the common
stock of the country prevented their seizure before their arrival in
Sweden, and once they had completed that much of their transit,
they passed beyond any possibility of capture, as the English fleet
was unable to enter the Baltic to establish a blockade of the German
ports. The effect of this was to make the blockade, under the old
established rules of international law, impossible. To obviate this
difficulty, the English amended the Declaration of London by the
Order in Council dated the 29th of October, 1914, the only para-
graph of which directly affects the Doctrine of Continuous Voy-
ages, being No. 2:
"When it is shown to the satisfaction of one of his
Majesty's principle secretaries that the enemy government
is drawing supplies for its armed forces from or through a
neutral country, he may direct that in respect of ships
bound for a port in that country Article 35 of the said
Declaration shall not apply. Such direction shall be noti-
& 2 Westlake, International Law, 28.
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fled in the London Gazette and shall operate until the
same is withdrawn. So long as such direction is in force,
a vessel which is carrying conditional contraband to a port
in that country shall not be immune from capture."
It will be noticed that this is in direct opposition to the Ber-
muda decision. The effect of this was that the English took the
tables of imports for the neutral countries adjacent to Germany
or any of her Allies, and when the figures for the imports of any
contraband or conditional contraband goods through that country
began to exceed those of normal times, she declared the ports
closed to cargos of a like or similar nature. As it is further recog-
nized. that when in modern times a nation makes war, it is organ-
ized as a unit for that purpose, the distinction as to whether the
goods are for civilian or military consumption becomes of no
importance. The leading case on this new extension is the Kim.6
The Kim was a Norwegian ship voyaging between the United
States and Copenhagen, Denmark. November 14th it was cap-
tured by an English cruiser. Part of her cargo was rubber, which
was consigned by the claimant, an American citizen, to a Swede
at Landscrona, Sweden. At a hearing in the prize court, evidence
was offered by the Crown to the effect that the final destination
of the rubber was Germany. The President held that as the Doc-
trine of Continuous Voyage and Transportation, both as regards
carriage by land and sea, was part of the international law at the
commencement of the war in August, 1914, all goods which were
for the use of the German Government, although nominally going
to a neutral port as their port of destination, must be condemned
as lawful prize. The thirty-nine packages of rubber were con-
demned.
The case of the Balto, a Norwegian ship which left New York
for Gottenburg on the 14th of October, 1915, goes even further.
Included in her cargo were 74 bales of sole leather consigned from
Boston to Mr. Ernst Aqvist, the managing director of a Swedish
firm which carried on a business of the manufacture of boots and
shoes at Orebro, Sweden. There was some documentary evidence
that the latter might eventually become shoes for the German or
Austrian armies, as Germany was buying shoes in Sweden, but
none that the particular shipment would be so used. The claimants
said that as the goods were intended for manufacture in a neutral
6113 (N. S.) L. T. 1R. 1064. In this case the consignor was a neutral
citizen as was the consignee, and the cargo was proceeding from one neutra'
port to another. The defense proved a market for rubber in Sweden. It seems
to have been condemned merely upon suspicion.
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country, they did not come under Article 30 of the Declaration of
London. In effect the voyage was broken and the goods became a
part of the common stock of the country. The President of the
Prize Court held (a) that contraband material imported into a
neutral country to be manufactured into goods destined for the
enemy, does not become part of the common stock of the country
so as to defeat the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages; and (b) that
accordingly an order should be made directing the claimants to
make discovery of the books and documents relating to their sales
of b>oots, as well as of leather, from August, 1913, to the date
,if sale."
The substance of the British position seems to be that, without
declaring it, they established a new form of blockade and stretched
the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages so as to cover it. Being
unable to establish a formal blockade of the ports of the hostile
nations, she blockaded all those countries through which contra-
band goods might be shipped to enemies, allowing only what was
necessary for the uses of the neutral countries to pass, and justified
this action by the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages.
The tendency of the law today is to avoid frictions and attack
problems from the practical standpoint of doing equity to the
parties. Viewed in this manner, the new extention of the doctrine
by the English is logical. As long as the blockade is recognized
as a legitimate form of hostile action, it would be an absurdity to
cripple its effectiveness by hedging it about with rules, other than
those made to safeguard the principles of humanity. It seems that
England might be justified in this as much, and as logically, as the
other nations have been in making their enforced extensions of
the doctrine.
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